Some Americans are going through a period of introspection and realizing that something about U.S. Middle East policy is not working. Part of this is reflected in their frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. President Biden tried to avoid talks with Netanyahu and was almost forced into one. He has also made negative comments about Netanyahu, as Bob Woodward reports in his new book. No one should fall off their chair because of these revelations. With Biden, Netanyahu completes a whole series: During Netanyahu's long tenure as Prime Minister of Israel, four presidents were in power – Clinton, Obama, Trump and Biden – and all four spoke badly about him at one time or another. If Kamala Harris is elected in November, it's safe to bet a fifth president will be added to the line-up.

Netanyahu wasn't elected to befriend American presidents; He was elected to protect Israeli interests. Of course, in a friendly situation it is sometimes easier to protect these interests. Conversely, protecting friendship sometimes requires compromising interests. It is up to the Prime Minister to decide when it is better to insist on something he believes is important at the expense of eroding friendship, and when it is better to be flexible and avoid straining the relationship. In the course of the war so far he has shown himself to be more flexible than it appears (the major attack in Lebanon came very late). He also clashed with the US on several occasions when it actually seemed appropriate to do so (example: his insistence that Israel invade Rafah).

Why do many American officials seem frustrated? For two main reasons. First – because war is risky and a distraction for the government. The US wants it to end, while Israel doesn't want it to end too soon. This is a cyclical phenomenon in US-Israel relations. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel was forced to give in by the USA after Egypt's Third Army was encircled. You have achieved enough – was the claim. Henry Kissinger did not want Anwar Sadat's Egypt to be unduly defeated. He did not want to witness the overthrow of a pro-American Egyptian regime. In hindsight, he was probably right. Israel remained in a place that allowed progress in the ceasefire talks and then in the peace talks. But, as already mentioned, we know that in hindsight. The alternative route of continuing the fight until IDF troops entered Cairo and Damascus was not tested.

Americans want today what they wanted during the Third Army siege. They believe that Israel has done its part; They believe it is time to end the war. This is strange in two ways. First, Egypt was an ally; Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran are not. It's not entirely clear why the US wants the war to end when Israel may be in the process of defeating some of these forces (not Iran, but perhaps the other two). Perhaps U.S. officials assume that Israel cannot achieve complete victory. Perhaps they suspect – and this is a defensible position – that the costs of continuing the bloody war and regional stability would be too high.

The second thing the US wants is a “day after” vision that includes several cornerstones of American policy (Palestinian Authority control of Gaza, advancing the two-state solution, etc.). They have been at odds with Israel on this issue almost from the first day of the campaign. And it is not at all certain that their stance is the more valid one.

Some of the officials realize that something in their politics is not working. No agreement was reached in Gaza, only a few hostages were released and no arrangements were made for the day after. In Lebanon, a year of negotiations yielded no results and war broke out. Sufficient deterrence was not achieved in Iran, either against the Iranians, who insisted on an attack, or against Israel, who insisted on a response. In the New York Times, Ezra Klein wrote an article titled “How Biden’s Middle East Policy Collapsed.” It was an insightful article that leads to an interview with journalist Franklin Foer, who wrote a long article in The Atlantic in which he also testified to the government's failures. And there were several others in different newspapers saying the same thing in different ways.

Where has the administration failed? Let's try to summarize a long explanation by relying on a key sentence in Klein's article: “Like many Americans,” Klein wrote, “my frame of reference after October 7th was September 11th, when America was attacked, as civilians of “We were killed by a terrorist.” Enemy who wanted to provoke us into a destructive reaction.”

This is the reason for the failure. The frame of reference of Americans like Klein and some government officials is misplaced. October 7th was not September 11th. Israel is not a superpower like America. Lebanon is not as far away as Afghanistan. Without minimizing the seriousness of the September 11th blow and without questioning the need for a forceful U.S. response to the al-Qaeda attack, the attempt to present this event as a relevant context for Israel today highlights the difficulties Americans face to understand the truth of Israel's situation.

September 11th was an act of deadly provocation designed to undermine the strength of the world's strongest empire. October 7th was a move designed to trigger a chain reaction whose ultimate goal was utter destruction. Al-Qaeda did not have the power to threaten the United States with destruction. In contrast, Israel's enemies have the power to threaten total destruction. And they have such intentions, newly released documents revealed this week. So after October 7, Israel had no choice but to fight for its life. This is not a “war of revival,” as Netanyahu pompously claimed, but a war of survival in the most basic sense of the word.

September 11th was an act of deadly provocation designed to undermine the strength of the world's strongest empire. October 7th was a move designed to trigger a chain reaction whose ultimate goal was utter destruction.

American officials see a short-term goal: to stop the bloodshed, to stabilize the region.

Israel sees a long-term goal: October 7 taught us that short-term calm, if not accompanied by a significant change in the regional balance of power, represents a long-term threat.

Much of what American officials say is valid. It is unclear how Israel will emerge from the war, who will manage Gaza, how calm will be maintained in Lebanon without the need for Israeli occupation, and how Israel will avoid a long-term entanglement that ends with the inability to stop the fighting to finally end. The Americans suspect – understandably – that Netanyahu does not want to talk about plans for the next day because they would complicate his political situation. Netanyahu suspects – understandably – that Americans are willing to gamble on Israel's future security to achieve calm. That is why Israel must insist on acting, even in the face of American opposition. For this reason, Israel must be careful to recognize the limits of American patience. Just as Golda Meir did in the weeks following the encirclement of Egypt's Third Army.

There were debates back then too. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (as Amiram Ezov writes in his 1973 book about the final days of the war) wanted to finish with a resounding victory, despite Kissinger's pressure. Dayan wanted to prolong the war for a few more days to bring the Third Army to its knees. And this after Israel had already put quite a strain on relations with the USA, as researcher Hagai Zoref describes in his article entitled “Golda Meir vs. Kissinger”.

The Israeli government, Tzoref wrote, “provided the IDF with the necessary political support to complete the territorial and tactical gains on the southern front, thereby preventing the withdrawal that Israel would have had to make in the face of strong international pressure, especially American .” led to the loss of these achievements. To achieve this, Golda Meir and her ministers implemented a risk management policy that significantly deteriorated relations with the United States.”

It's worth reading this article again because it shows that not much has changed since 1973. “The main issue on the agenda,” Tzoref wrote, “was the growing rift between Golda Meir and Kissinger. The Prime Minister's comments already expressed personal contempt and a loss of trust in the American. “He is not modest, he believes that his intelligence will be enough to solve everything,” she said.” As then as now, “the factor that most influenced the behavior of the Israeli leadership at the time was the need for risk management – “To oppose the American government while taking into account the extent of Israel’s ability to strike back.”

Golda fought back – and stopped at the right moment. Now Netanyahu is doing the same. Time will tell whether he has recognized the right time to stop.

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner's domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.